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(ii) 
SYNOPSIS 
The New Zealand procedures for disputing an assessment of income tax are 
traced from their inception and their present formulation is described. 
The equivalent procedures in Australia, England and Canada are surveyed, 
including a review of two government sponsored reports which include 
recommendations on tax administration reform. Brief mention is made of 
the procedures in Sweden, France and the Lnited States of America. 
Reconvnendations for reform, based on the principles of good tax adminis-
tration and using suggestions from the jurisdictions surveyed, are made 
in five areas. These are: the procedure prior to the first hearing; the 
requirement imposed on the taxpayer that he or she be limited to the 
grounds set out in the objection; the onus of proof being on the tax-
payer; the taxpayer's right to information concerning the Commissioner's 
case; and the time limits in the procedure~ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The significance of the administration of the tax system in any 
discussion of tax law reform has not been overlooked by commenta-
tors. For example, Congreve states: 
... for the practitioner the administration of the tax 
system is just as important as the charge to tax in the 
Act.I 
In the same vein, Reddy states: 
In my view, we cannot hope to achieve an equitable tax 
system without also ensuring that its application and 
administration is fair and workable.2 
In states still developing their taxation systems, administration 
has been emphasised as important:
3 
In recent years considerable thought and attention have 
been devoted to the fiscal policies best suited to the 
economic development of the areas of the free war ld. 
As part of this search for desirable fiscal policies, 
considerable stress is being placed on the role of tax 
policy . . . 1-bwever, a warning note seems appropriate. 
The concentration on tax policy - on the choice of 
taxes - may lead to insufficient considera- tion of the 
aspect of tax administration A survey of the 
available literature developing from the growing number 
of technical assistance missions underscores this 
warning. The administration of the tax system of the 
country involved generally receives relatively slight 
attention. It is increasingly apparent, however, that 
tax administration must receive far greater attention 
if the goals of tax policy are to be attained. 
1-bwever, there does not appear to have been a corresponding 
emphasis in l\ew Zealand on reform in this area by those charged 
with recommending reform. For example, the Task Force on Tax 
Reform4 (the Mccaw Committee) did not touch on this topic. 
This paper examines the objection and appeal procedure in three 
jurisdictions; Australia, canada and the l.hited Kingdom, and 
contrasts them with l\ew Zealand. It then discusses in, more detail 
those aspects of the procedure in New Zealand which either have 
been the subject of criticism by commentators, or which could be 
usefully reassessed in the light of practices overseas. It 
concludes with some recommendations for reform in New Zealand. 
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II. HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATION 
It seems that for as long as statutes have imposed taxes they have 
also provided for objection procedures. 
The Land-Tax Act 1878, which imposed a land tax, also provided for 
objections to any valuations made. 
5 There was a two-tier 
procedure, the Land-Tax Commissioner was empowered to allow 
objections, and if not allowed the objection could be heard in any 
Assessment Court. 6 The Court had the power to hear and determine 
all objections to any valuation of land and claims to exemption 
from land-tax. 7 
The Property Assessment Act 1879 (which regulated the assessment of 
real and personal property for the purposes of taxation) also 
contained a two-tier objection procedure, first to the Commissioner 
and then to a Board of Reviewers. 
8 This pro.:::edure was continued 
in the Property Assessment Act 1885. · 
Statutes imposing income tax also provided for objection procedure, 
commencing with the Land and Income Assessment Act 1891 which 
permitted both the taxpayer and the Commissioner to object to 
Boards of Review of Assessments. 
9 The Boards were designed to be 
independent, and no one holding office under the Act could also be 
a reviewer. 10 There was no further right of appeal from the 
Board; its decision was final and conclusive.
11 
This procedure was developed further in the Land and Income Tax Act 
1916, which provided for more extensive rights of appeal. Uider 
that Act, any person who had been assessed for land tax or income 
tax could object to that assessment .
12 There was a duty on the 
Comnissioner to consider the assessment and the power to alter 
it .13 1-bwever, if the Commissioner did not allow the objection 
the taxpayer had the right to have the objection heard and deter-
mined in the (then) Magistrate's Court.
14 For the purpose of 
hearing and determining the objection, the Court had all the powers 
- 3 -
vested in it in its ordinary civil jurisdiction as if it was an 
action between the objecting taxpayer and the Commissioner.
15 
In the Magistrate's Court the rules of evidence were relaxed and 
the Court could receive evidence as it thought fit, whether 
receivable in accordance with law in other proceedings or not. 
16 
The burden of proof was on the objector. 
17 The proceedings were 
not heard in open Court. 18 
From the determination of the Magistrate's Court there was a right 
of appeal to the (then) Supreme Court on a question of law or a 
question of fact if the amount of tax bona fide in dispute was more 
than £200. 19 The decision of the Supreme Court was subject to 
appeal to the Court of Appeal (except on a question of fact), and 
there was also the right to refer an objection on a question of law 
only directly to the Supreme Court.
20 
The objection provisions had no application to objections relating 
to any matter which the Act left to the discretion of the Commis-
sioner.21 
The provisions outlined were re-enacted in the Land and Income Tax 
Act 1923, and the Land and Income Tax Act 1954. 
In 1960 the prov 1s1ons were changed by the Inland Revenue Depart-
ment Amendment Act 1960, which set up Boards of Review. Taxation 
law is in fact the first area in which tribunals were developed to 
make determinations of questions of law.
22 
The Commissioners of D..Jstoms and Excise were given 
judicial powers by statutes dating from 1660 . . • they 
were the forerunners of many such powers, such as those 
of the Land Tax Commissioners who in 1799 were succee-
ded by the General Commissioners of Income Tax, a 
tribunal which still exists. 
The prime motive behind the Amendment Act was to permit taxpayers 
to object to discretionary determinations by the Cof'Mlissioner. 
.... 
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In addition, a~ a matter of convenience, the Board of Review took 
over the functions of the Magistrates Court in the hearing and 
determining of existing rights of objection. 23 
Referring to the right to object to discretionary determinations, 
the Minister of Finance said: 24 
It simply follows the lead of other countries in 
establishing the right of the taxpayer to have the 
Commissioner's decisions, where matters of moment are 
involved, determined by an independent authority. I 
should explain that one of the matters which had to be 
considered in framing the amendments now incorporated 
in this Bill was whether each and every one of the 
discretionary powers at present vested in the Commis-
sioner should be subject to appeal to this board. It 
became obvious that many of the Commissioner's powers 
are of a purely administrative character which do not 
affect the quantum of tax charged and which are merely 
preliminary to, or subsequent to, the making of an 
assessment . . . The Government has decided it will be 
quite unnecessary to make these purely administrative 
decisions subject to appeal, and the broad principle 
which has been adopted is to · permit appeals only in 
respect of those decisions which affect the quantum of 
tax payable. 
The 1960 Act provided for the establishment of Boards of Review of 
three members, the chairman being a barrister or solicitor of not 
less than seven years' practice. 25 Its function was to sit as a 
judicial authority for hearing and determining objections to 
assessments of tax or duty or to decisions or determinations of the 
Commissioner. 26 
The decision of the Board on a question of fact was final, but on a 
question of law there was the right to appeal to the Supreme Court 
and then Court of Appeal. 27 The Board could also state a case 
for the opinion of the Supreme Court on any question of law (and 
the Supreme Court could order the removal into the Court of Appeal 
any case stated for its opinion). 28 
In 1969 the Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee consi-
dered the desirability of returning the Board's jurisdiction to the 
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(then) Magistrate's Court, which a minority of the Committee 
supported. 29 The majority, however, disagreed, on the grounds 
that the Board had a wider jurisdiction than a Magistrate (in 
particular in relation to discretionary decisions of the Commis-
sioner), and that it was desirable that the cases be heard by one 
body. 
The Inland Revenue Department Amendment Act took away the right to 
appeal on a question of fact from the body hearing the dispute at 
first instance. The Minister of Finance justified this in the 
following way: 30 
There are two points to take into account in consider-
ing the reasons for the change. The first is that 
whereas a Magistrate's decision is that of one man, the 
decision of a board is the decision of a majority of a 
three-man tribunal. The second point is that there is 
a new provision dealing with rights of direct reference 
to the Supreme Court on questions or fact. 
This provision was designed for cases where there were complicated, 
mixed questions of fact and law or questions of fact involving 
considerable sums. 
In 1974 the Boards of Review were abolished and replaced by 
Taxation Review Authorities pursuant to the Inland Revenue Depart-
ment Act 197 4. The major difference between the two bodies was 
that the Authority consisted of only one person. This change was 
criticised by the Opposition on the grounds that the Society of 
Accountants had expressed reservations on such a structure. When 
the Bill was debated in Parliament, the justification was that:
31 
In view of the amount of work involved and the 
difficulty, mentioned by the Member for Wellington 
Central, of obtaining personnel prepared to serve on 
the appeal authority, it was considered, after much 
discussion, that a one-man authority would be ,quite 
sufficient to do the work... The Bill makes provision 
for the appointment of more than one authority, if it 
should be felt at some later stage that the work load 
is such that it might be desirable to have more than 
one authority in order to prevent a backlog or delays. 
0 
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The present indications, in terms of the amount of work 
and the e'xperience of the man proposed to be the 
authority, are that one authority will be sufficient. 
The Taxation Rewview Authority is, in fact, a District Court Judge. 
The 1974 Act reverted to permitting appeals to the Supreme Court on 
questions of fact ( where the amount of tax or duty was $1, OOO or 
more). Since then the monetary limits have been increased.
32 
Such a change was recommended by the Public and Administrative Law 
Reform Committee in 1969. It stated that there should be a full 
right of appeal (i.e. including questions of fact) to the High 
Court. 33 A monetary limit of $500 was suggested, however, 
because it was thought desirable to avoid appeals involving 
relatively small amounts. In its report in 1972 the Committee 
reviewed that recommendation at the request of the Minister of 
Justice and reaffirmed it. 34
 
III. PRESENT LEGISLATION 
The objection and appeal procedures applicable today are found in 
Part III of the Income Tax Act 1976 and Part II of the Inland 
Revenue Department Act. It is not apparent from parliamentary 
debates why the legislation is in two separate Acts. These 
provisions are designed to be a code by which a taxpayer can 
dispute an assessment or a determination. 
35 For convenience only 
assessments will be referred to hereafter. (Recent developments 
concerning the attack of an assessment by means other than the 
objection procedure will be mentioned briefly later.) 
Any person who has been assessed for income tax may object. 
36 He 
or she must make a written notice of objection stating the grounds 
of objection not less than fourteen days after the date on which 
the notice of assessment is given. 
37 The time limit for making 
the objection is stated in the notice of assessment (as a matter of 
.... 
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practice one month is given). The Co
mmissioner considers the 
objection and may alter the assessment.
 38 If the objection is 
not wholly allowed by the Commissioner a
nd the taxpayer is still 
dissatisfied, the taxpayer can require th
e objection be heard and 
determined by a Jaxation Review Authority.
39 
Objections may be referred to the High 
Court directly by way of 
case stated on a question of law or a que
stion of fact (whether or 
not it also relates to a question of law
). 40 The Court may grant 
leave for an objection relating to a 
question of fact to be 
referred directly to the High Court if, 
because of the amount of 
tax in dispute, or the general or public 
importance of the matter, 
or its extraordinary difficulty or for 
any other reason it is 
desirable that the High Court hear and det
ermine the matter.
41 
A number of matters are specifically ex
cluded from any right of 
objection, for example, any matter left 
to the discretion of the 
Minister, and any valuation or apportionm
ent made by the Valuer-
General under the Valuation of Land Act
 1951 or the Income Tax 
Act. 42 
Turning to the Taxation Review Author
ity, the Inland Revenue 
Department Act and Regulations provide f
or its establishment and 
procedure. 
Parties may represent themselves or be re
presented by a barrister 
or solicitor or any other person. 
43 The rules of evidence are 
less formal; the Authority may receive as
 evidence material which 
in his opinion will assist him to de
al effectively with the 
proceeding, whether or not it would be 
admissible in a court of 
law. 44 The taxpayer is limited at the
 hearing to the grounds 
stated in the objection and carries the bu
rden of proof.
45 
The Authority may state a case for the opi
nion of the High Court on 
a question of law.
46 
..... 
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As has been noted above, the determination of the Authority may be 
subject to appeal to the High Court if it involves a question of 
law or the amount involved is $2, OOO or more. 
4 7 In all other 
cases the determination is finai.
48 
The High Court's decision may be subject to appeal to the Court of 
Appeal, and then to the Privy Council.
49 
The objection procedure was designed to be a code. Recently, 
however, there have been at tempts by taxpayers dissatisfied with 
assessments that the Commissioner proposes to make, to invoke the 
procedure in the Judicature .Amendment Act 1972 for judicial 
review. The availability of the procedure was considered in the 
case of CIR v. Lemmington Holdings Limited.
50 
In that.case the taxpayer was seeking a declaration preventing the 
withdrawal of approval given previously by the Commissioner for a 
plan permitting investors in a scheme to set off estimated losses 
against their employment income. 
The Court of Appeal rejected the use of judicial review. Richard-
son, J., said: 51 
First, to restrain the Commissioner from making 
assessments within his jurisdiction would be both 
contrary to the scheme of the income tax legislation 
and outside the proper scope of the Judicature .Amend-
ment Act 1972 . . . [I]n our view it is implicit in 
Section 4 that the discharge of an imperative statutory 
duty is not amenable to judicial restraint. 
It is the belief of one commentator that there will be a growth in 
the forms of action outside the objection procedure. 
52 By way of 
example he cites review proceedings in respect of the Commission-
er's administrative functions not leading directly to an assessment. 
The procedure for objection and appeal in New Zealand has, it can 
be seen, been subject to reform. It would appear from an examina-
tion of parliamentary debates, that the reforms have not always 
.... 
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been the result of a tho'rough analysis of what would constitute 
desirable reforms, and that administrative convenience has been a 
significant motivating factor. The fact that the procedure has not 
been subject to widespread er i tic ism must also have been signi fi-
cant in the retention of the procedures in their present form. 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Australia 
The procedure for objecting to an assessment by the Commissioner in 
Australia is very similar to that in New Zealand. It is set out in 
Div 2 of Part V of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936. The 
legislation is explicit in that no other remedies are available to 
the taxpayer when the notice of assessment is definitive in 
form. 53 
The procedure set down in the legislation commences by providing 
that the taxpayer may, if dissatisfied with an assessment, lodge a 
written objection with the Commissioner.
54 The Comm}ssioner is 
obliged to consider it and give written notice of the deci-
sion. 55 (There is, as in New Zealand, no time limit prescribed 
for this step.) A taxpayer dissatisfied with that decision may, 
within sixty days of being served with written notice of the 
Commissioner's decision, request the Commissioner either to refer 
the decision to a Board of Review for review, or to treat the 
objection as an appeal and forward it to the Supreme Court of a 
specified state. 56 The taxpayer is limited to the grounds stated 
in the objection, and the burden of proof is on the taxpayer.
57 
Subject to one exception (regarding the remission of additional tax 
in certain circumstances), the Board of Review has all the powers 
and functions . of the Commissioner in making assessments. 
58 The 
Board's decisions are given in writing.
59 
-
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If dissatisfied with the Board of Review's decisions, the parties 
may appeal to a Supreme Court if the case involves a question of 
60 law. The Board must refer a question of law to the Supreme 
Court if reques'ted by either party. 
61 The appeal is heard by a 
single Judge of the Supreme Court. From that court's decision an 
appeal lies to the Federal Court of Australia by leave and then to 
the High Court by special leave, 
62 or from the Supreme Court to 
the High Court directly by special leave.
63 
In 1975 a review committee (the Asprey Committee) made a number of 
recommendations about reform of the objection and appeal proce-
dure. 64 These will be discussed later under the speci fie topics 
for reform, however it is interesting to note that the Committee's 
recommendations in this area have led, in Australia, to legislative 
reform. 
Administrative law procedures for review of assessments, appear to 
be an avenue which is increasingly becoming available.
65 
Taxpayers now enjoy greater opportunity than before in 
challenging the acts and decisions of revenue authori-
ties in the execution of their powers and responsibili-
ties under various taxing instruments. Further, 
generally the courts have interpreted the legislation 
in a manner which has restricted the attempts of 
revenue authorities to exclude review. 
Although the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 
(CTH), which provided that statutory right to seek review of an 
administrative decision, expressly excluded decisions making or 
leading up to the making of assessments, it:
66 
... has been construed narrowly, thereby maximising the 
scope for review. The courts have adopted the view 
that decisions making or forming part of the process of 
making or leading up to the making of assessments of 
calculations of tax or duty must be integrally or 
closely connected to the process for the exclusion to 
operate. 
-
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England 
The English procedure for objection and appeal is si
milar to New 
Zealand's in several respects, but one obvious differ
ence is that 
the composition of the body which hears the majority 
of matters at 
first instance is quite different from the Taxation R
eview Author-
ity in New Zealand. 
In England there are two bodies which hear appeals 
in the first 
instance, Special Commissioners and General Commission
ers. 
General Commissioners have been described as "busy loc
al amateurs", 
and their method of appointment is similar to the a
ppointment of 
justices of the peace. 
67 To understand this use of laypeople it 
is necessary to look at the historical origins. 
68 The Commis-
sioners were bodies of local men of property who wer
e responsible 
for ensuring that revenue from their locality fl
owed to the 
Exchequer. Subsequently all the · administrative 
functions of 
taxation have been assumed by the Board of Inland Rev
enue, but the 
General Commissioners remain. Their advantages are s
een as being 
their knowledge of local conditions and local peopl
e. They are 
guided by a clerk who is usually a solicitor. 
The Special Commissioners, on the other hand, are us
ually legally 
qualified and appointed from the Bar or senior le
vels of the 
Department of Revenue. Their original function was to
 hear appeals 
not suitable for the General Commissioners (because t
hey were too 
specialised, or raised questions of privacy). Now the
 important or 
time consuming cases are almost automatically heard by
 the Special 
Commissioners. 
The legislation sets out to whom the right of 
appeal lies. 
Generally speaking, an appeal lies to the General C
ommissioners, 
except in certain specified cases, or except where 
the appellant 
elects to bring the appeal before the Special Com
missioners. 
69 
Examples of matters which are heard by the diff
erent bodies 
.... 
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follow. Claims to personal reliefs by persons resident in the 
U.K., objections to notices of P.A.Y.E. codings, and questions as 
to the annual value of land are heard by the General Commissioners 
only. 70 Appeals against assessments in respect of the investment 
income of overseas life assurance companies, assessments on 
individuals to whom the income of a close company has been appor-
tioned, and assessments made under the provisions for preventing 
tax avoidance by the transfer of income aborad are heard by the 
Special Commissioners only. 
71 Appeals relating to exemption 
certificates for sub-contractors in the construction industry are 
an example of cases where the appellant may elect to appeal to the 
Special Commissioners. 7
2 
Turning to the procedure when appealing to the Commissioners, the 
onus is on the taxpayer to show that the assessment should be 
reduced or set aside. 73 If, however, the taxpayer, having issued 
a notice of appeal, can come to an agreement with the Revenue, then 
that agreement has effect as if it was the result of the determina-
tion of the appeal. 74 Such an agreement can be repudiated by the 
appellant by notice in writing given within thirty days.
75 
At the hearing the Commissioners are permitted to act on circum-
stantial evidence, for example they can taken into account evidence 
relating to other similar businesses. They can also rely on their 
own local knowledge. 76 
There are no rules of procedure, and the taxpayer can conduct the 
case in person or be represented by counsel, a solicitor, or an 
accountant. 77 
In regard to General Commissioners, one commentator characterises 
the procedure thus: 78 
What the system is intended to produce is rough 
justice; this, provided the justice is not too rough, 
appears to be the way that the legislature and the 
judiciary want it. 
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On determining an appeal, the Commissioners may reduce or increase 
an assessment, or, if they cannot say on the evidence whether the 
assessment is excessive or inadequate, the assessment stands.
79 
If dissatisfied with the Commissioners' determination on the 
grounds that it is wrong on a point of law, the parties may within 
thirty days request a case be stated for the opinion of the High 
Court. SO The time limit for transmitting the case stated to the 
High Court is thirty days. 
81 The appeal is heard by a single 
judge in the Olancery Division, who will hear and determine any 
question of law. 82 
Although the High Court does not entertain an appeal on a question 
of fact, there can be an exception to this rule. The Court will 
intervene if the only reasonable conclusion from the evidence is in 
contradiction to the Commissio~er's determination.
83 
From the High Court an appeal lies to the Court Appeal, and then to 
the rbuse of Lords. Under certain circumstances, an appeal lies 
direct to the rbuse of Lords.
84 
In addition to ·the appeal process, other remedies sre available to 
the taxpayer in the form of prerogative orders of mandamus, 
prohibition, or certiorari, or a declaratory judgment.
85 These 
are only available however if the remedy by way of appeal is not 
available, and would be appropriate where, for example, there has 
been a clear excess of jurisdiction, or failure by officers of the 
Department to perform some mandatory duty. However:
86 
these alternative remedies are strictly circum-
scribed and very largely discretionary, and will not be 
granted where an appeal to the Commissioners is the 
prescribed remedy. 
The English legislation provides an example of a system which has 
modern provisions grafted onto old practices, with a resulting 
hybrid of formal judicial procedures and informal quasi-judicial 
procedures. 
LAW LIBRARY 
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Canada 
The Canadian system for objection and appeal was amended as a 
result of investigation in 1966 and recommendations for reform made 
by the Royal Commission on Taxation (the Carter Commission).
87 
The Commission expressed concern at the processes of tax adjudica-
tion. It cited the increase in the volume of objections as 
indicating that the administrative appeal procedures were not 
adequate. 88 To remedy this inadequacy, it proposed a procedure 
prior to the notice of objection. 
89 With the aim of enabling 
disputed assessments to be resolved without litigation, the 
Commission recommended a three step procedure, a pre-assessment 
conference, a district conference, and a regional conference. 
The function of the pre-assessment conference was to establish the 
facts of the case and to clarify any misunderstandings between the 
parties. The taxpayer would receive notice that the Division 
intended to amend the taxpayer's return unless representations were 
made within fifteen days. The conference would then follow, where 
the taxpayer would meet with the assessor and the section head. 
The second step proposed was that if, having received an assess-
ment, the taxpayer decided to file a notice of objection, the 
taxpayer should then meet with the Appeals Section of the District 
Office, which would consider the case and make a recommendation to 
the Director of Taxation. A taxpayer objecting would have to file 
a notice of objection within ninety days of the mailing of the 
notice of assessment. 
The third step was a Regional Conference, in effect, an appeal at 
the regional level. 
Each of the three steps would be at the option of the taxpayer. If 
the taxpayer did not exercise the option the intended assessment or 
assessment would stand. 
... 
-,2 
- 15 -
The Commission also recommended reform of the bodies hearing 
the 
objection. 90 It proposed a Tax Court to replace the Tax Ap
peal 
Board. The Court was to be a court of record, the impor
tant 
decisions of which would be published, and oral decisions were
 to 
be given where P,Ossible. 
The proposals for conferences were adopted. Four Regional App
eals 
Offices were established.
91 
In 1970 the appeal system was restructured to ensure that 
the 
officers within the department who had dealt with an assessm
ent 
were not the same officers who subsequently reconsidered it.
92 
In 1972, sixty three per cent of the notices of objection sent
 in 
were resolved in district offices, the remaining thirty seven 
per 
cent were transferred to Regional Appeals Offices. Those offi
ces 
resolved ninety three per cent of the objections they conside
red, 
leaving seven per cent to go to the Tax Review Boards and 
the 
courts. 93 
In 1980 it was decided to discontinue Regional Appeals Offi
ces 
because of i.imited resources available to the Department. 
94 Now 
the responsibility to confirm Notices of Objection rests with 
the 
appeal section of the District Offices. 
95 
The proposals for the structure of the Courts were followed: 
. . . in substance, though departing from them in form. 
The Trial Division and the Appeal Division of the 
Federal Court fill the roles in which the Commission 
cast its Tax Court and the Exchequer Court. 
The Tax Appeal Board continued in existence (renamed the Tax Rev
iew 
Board) although it changed its method of operation. It 
was 
designed to be informal, accessible, and cheap. 
The Chairman described it thus:
96 
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The new Board has many advantages in operation over the 
previous Tax Appeal Board, and this is the result of 
the wording of the Act itself, which specifically 
spells out that the hearings are to be informal, not 
tied by the technical rules of evidence, before a 
Tribunal where the ordinary citizen may have his day in 
court, so to speak, when he feels aggrieved by the 
manner in which the Department of National RevE=nue has 
treated his tax assessment or, more particularly, the 
way in which some assessor in a local District Office 
has dealt with his tax problem. 
Such cases, if taken to a court of law with its formal 
procedure for discovery of, settlement of, and adjudi-
cation of, issues of fact and law, would unduly hamper 
the individual of modest means from obtaining at low 
cost an impartial review of his grievance. 
The Tax Review Board Act states: 
9(1) Where an appeal is made to the Board under any 
Act, the appeal shall be made in writing but no 
special form of petition or pleadings shall be 
required by the Board, unless the Act under 
whi~h the appeal is made expressly otherwise 
provides. 
9(2) t-.btwithstanding the provisions of the Act under 
which an appeal is made, the Board is not bound 
by any legal or technical rules of evidence in 
conducting an hearing for the purposes of that 
Act, and all appeals shall be dealt with by the 
Board as informally and expeditiously as the 
circumstances and considerations of fairness 
will allow. 
10(3) The Board shall given reasons for its decisions 
but, except where the Board deems it in the 
public interest in any particular case that the 
reasons given by it be in writing, reasons given 
by it need not be in writing. 
The Canadian system can be characterised as being based on an 
informal dispute resolution model, incorporating, to borrow an 
I 
analogy from the criminal law, the concept of di version. A large 
percentage of tax disputes are diverted from the appeal structure 
•, 
by the use of conferences. In addition, if the dispute is taken to 
the formal tribunals, the conferences serve to clarify the issues 
for determination. 
. ; ; 
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The canadian provisions are the most recently devised of the 
jurisdictions surveyed in this paper, adopted in response to a 
study of the adequacy of the former provisions. They have been 
amended subsequently in the light of evaluation. For this reason 
they are of particular interest. 
an important and surprisingly 
tice 11 • 97 
They have been des~ribed as " ... 
fast-changing area of tax prac-
Although beyond the scope of this paper, another aspect of Canadian 
tax practice which is closely linked to the conference system 
outlined is that of revenue rulings. The carter Commission 
recommended the introduction of revenue rulings as a device for 
''··· fostering and encouraging the self-assessment system .•• 11 • 98 
Designed to increase certainty and uniformity and to reduce 
litigation, the procedure incorporates discussion with the taxpayer 
prior to the ruling being made. Although the objective is differ-
ent (i.e. the issue of a ruling as. opposed to the resolution, if 
possible, of an objection) the means used are similar. 
DiagrarTmatic Representation of the Appeal Process 
in Income Tax Matters 
t-ew Zealand 
Assessment 
~ 
Cl:Jjection 
~ 
CorTmissioner's Decision on ClJjection 
~ 
Taxation Review Authority 
J. 
High Court 
J, 
Court of Appeal 
J. 
Privy Council 
~ 
High Court by case stated 
J. 
Court of Appeal 
~ 
Privy Council 
.... 
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Australia99 
Assessment 
l 
Objection 
Commissioner's 
l 
Board of Review 
d 
1 . . ec1s1on on Objection 
l 
Supreme Court 
l l 
Supreme Court Full 
~ 
Federal Full High Court 
l 
Full Federal 
Court 
Full High Court Full High Court 
l 
Full High Court 
Canada 
Assessment 
l 
-----..,-----
Objection to Minister 
l 
Tax Review Board or Federal 
l 
Federal Court of Appeal 
l 
Reconsideration 
l 
Tax Review Board 
l 
Federal Court Trial Division Supreme Court of Canada 
! 
Federal Court of Appeal 
l 
Supreme Court of Canada 
Court 
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Sweden, France and the USA 
The objection and appeal provisions in Sweden, France and the USA 
are part of different legal systems. Brief mention is made of them 
in the present context because the striking similarity to the 
procedures in the jurisidictions studied in this paper. 
In Sweden an appeal goes in the first instance to a local tax 
appeal court. From that court's decision there is a right of 
appeal to higher tax courts, first the Audit Court and finally the 
Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden.
100 
In France a simplified procedure for small business taxpayers was 
introduced in 1963, applicable to income and other taxes as well as 
value-added and related taxes.
101 
Taxpayers in the United States can proceed in one of three courts, 
the Tax Court, a federal district court, or the Court of 
Claims .102 There are advantages and disadvantages in respect of 
each forum, but the Tax Court is the most popular because the 
taxpayers do not have to pay the disputed tax first and claim for a 
refund prior to conmencing proceedings. 
The availability of 
h . II 103 Th s opp1ng . . e 
different 
different 
courts 
courts 
has 
have 
resulted 
adopted 
in "forum 
different 
interpretations of the legislation, which encourages this trend. 
Other factors which taxpayers consider include differences between 
the judges (specialists or generalists), the appeal rights from the 
courts (appeal as of right from the Tax Court to the Court of 
Appeals, decisions of the Court of Claims being reviewable only by 
the Supreme Court), the right to a trial by jury in the district 
court (which enables the taxpayer to raise arguments based on local 
custom and the taxpayer's reputation and standing), and the 
availability of a small claims procedure as part of the Tax Court. 
.... 
y . 
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The simplified procedure for small claims was introduced because i
t 
was thought that: 1
04 
... many taxpayers with small claims believe they have 
no practical opportunity to present their claim before 
an impartial tribunal. 
The simplified procedure can be used if the amount in dispute i
s 
less than $5,000 for any one tax year. The proceedings ar
e 
conducted informally, and the decision is final, not open to revie
w 
by any other court. The decision is not to be treated as 
a 
precedent in any other case. 
REC().1MENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
Discussion of reform must focus first on the aims of the objectio
n 
and appeal process, and then consider whether proposed reforms g
o 
towards fulfilling those aims. Al though the aims of tax law i
n 
general have ben stated from early times, 
105 the more speci fie 
aims of the objection and appeal procedures have seldom bee
n 
defined. In Canada it was stated that the system should, inte
r 
alia, dispose of appeals promptly, efficiently and in accordanc
e 
with law. 1
06 To that list can be added the requirement that the 
procedure be accessible. 
In the following sections specific amendments to the objection an
d 
appeal procedure are discussed which are suggested on the basis o
f 
experience in other jurisdictions. 
An objection or appeal is, of course, based on a specific provisio
n 
or provisions of the legislation, and although beyond the scope o
f 
this paper, the possibility of amendment of other provisions of th
e 
legislation should not be overlooked. If it appears that particu
-
.. 
lar provisions generate a large number of disputes then it may b
e 
appropriate to look at not only the way the disputes are dealt wit
h 
but also at the provisions themselves. For example, of the 15
7 
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decisions of the Taxation Review Authority reported in 1982 and 
1983, fifty-six concerned the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act 
(which provides for items of expenditure or loss deductible in 
respect of income from employment). rt may be that, upon closer 
analysis, these cases are not particularly significant and could be 
reduced by amending the legislation without diminishing the 
taxpayers' right to challenge assessments. 
Procedure Prior to the First Hearing 
The Carter Commission, as discussed already, propsed an extensive 
structure of pre-proceedings conferences. Its recommendations have 
been enacted, and subsequently amended in the light of experience, 
although the fundamental elements have been retained. 
The proposal for the introduction of a pre-proceedings procedure 
has found favour in both New Zealand· and Australia. 
Green argues that a pre-proceeding conference would be useful to 
isolate the issues in the dispute, or even to go to the extent of 
finally determining the grounds of tne objection. He advocates 
this procedure on the grounds that in his view the taxpayer goes 
".. • into contentious proceedings blindfolded with an extremely 
broad barrelled blunderbus pointed at him or her by the Commis-
sioner11 .107 
The Asprey Committee based its support for such a procedure on 
considerations of speed and the reduction of costs. It criticised 
the practice at some hearings where all the evidence is formally 
proved as if at a trial, using up a great deal of time on matters 
which ought to be common ground. It recommended therefore a short 
preliminary hearing before a single member of the Board to elimi-
nate the fact-finding work of the Board by admitting as much of the 
facts as possible and thereby narrowing the issues to those facts 
actually in dispute. lOS This would also, the Commit tee believed, 
result in a narrowing of the questions of law. 
. ; ; 
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An effective pre-proceedings procedure would eliminate most of the 
criticisms of the present procedure based on limitation of grounds, 
onus of proof, the taxpayer's right to information, and time limits. 
A procedure analogous to that proposed by the Carter Commission 
would require administrative rather than legislative change. In a 
small jurisdiction such as New Zealand a two-tier structure would 
not be necessary. The use of a meeting between the taxpayer (and 
advisors if wished) and the Department of Inland Revenue to isolate 
the issues in contention, and resolve them if possible, would 
benefit both the taxpayer and the Department. A time limit could 
be included to ensure that the use of a meeting would not slow down 
the process. 
Limitation of the Grounds of Appeal 
Cx'le aspect of the objection and appeal procedures which has come 
under criticism in New Zealand is the rule contained in Section 36 I 
of the Inland Revenue Department Act 1974, that is: 
on the hearing and determination of any objection, 
the objector shall be limited to the grounds stated in 
his objection. 
For example, Molloy says:
109 
In any other sphere of the civil law, a party who 
realises that his present pleadings will not enable him 
to argue his case properly can amend them: on terms as 
to the granting of an adjournment, or costs, if 
necessary. to protect the other side. In the tax field 
any other rules places the need for certainty as to the 
quantum of the Revenue take too far ahead of the 
demands of justice for the citizen. 
The Australian legislation in this respect is si~ilar to New 
Zealand. Section 190 states in part: 
Upon every such reference or appeal - [to a Board of 
Review or the Supreme Court] 
.... 
• i j 
-
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(a) The taxpayer shall be limited to the 
grounds stated in his objection. 
1-bwever, a difference is found on the issue of the stating of the 
grounds of the objection, in Australia the legislation requires 
that they be stated fully and detail, whereas in New Zealand the 
grounds should be stated "shortly'1 •
110 
The Australian provision has been interpreted liberally by the 
Courts and Boards. The grounds of objection are not to be inter-
preted" ... technically, narrowly or with rigidity
11
•
111 
It appears that: 112 
where 
particular 
the doubt 
taxpayer's 
there is a reasonable doubt whether a 
point is covered by the grounds of objection 
will, if possible, be resolved in the 
favour. 
One possible interpretation of this development by the Courts and 
Boards is that it is a recognition of the difficult position the 
taxpayer is put in, and is an attempt to mitigate the rigidity of 
the rule to alleviate that position. In other words, it may be a 
tacit recognition that the rule is unfair. 
The As prey Committee considered this issue. It stated that the 
limitation was " highly unsatisfactory and unfair to the 
taxpayer".113 
rt pointed out that the taxpayer is put in the position of having 
to state grounds of objection without necessarily being able to 
ascertain the basis of the Commissioner's assessment. 
It recommended that the taxpayer should not have an unlimited right 
to amend the grounds of objection, but should be able to contest 
' 
the case on any grounds open to him or her when first faced with 
the Commissioner's argument. The basis of the Committee's view was 
the desire to place the Commissioner and taxpayer on an equal 
footing. 114 
.... 
:,:> . 
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The Canadian system for objection and appeal includes, as discus-
sed, a highly developed procedure for objecting before reaching a 
formal tribunal. If, after the procedures outlined above, the 
taxpayer wishes to continue with the notice of objection, the 
procedure is comparatively informal. 
Against this background therefore, it is possible to see why 
notices of objection stating that the taxpayer objects because the 
assessment is wrong in fact and in law are not in practice challen-
ged by the Department of National Revenue. 
Turning to the specific issue of whether the taxpayer can raise new 
grounds at the Board, although this was formerly refused, the new 
trend is to accept amendment.
115 Obviously, however, if the 
taxpayer has been in di scuss i on the i ssues will hdve been i so lated 
to a far greater extent than is the case where there is no system 
of conferences. 
In England, the Taxes Management Act 1970 provides that an appeal 
may be brought against an as sessment to tax by a notice of appeal 
in writing given within thirty days after the date of the notice of 
assessment. 
Section 31(5) provides: 
The notice of appeal against any assessment shall 
specify the grounds of appeal, but on the hearing of 
the appeal the Commissioners may allow the appellant to 
put forward any ground not specified in the notice, and 
take it into consideration if satisfied that the 
omission was not wilful or unreasonable. 
One commentator stated that the grounds of the appeal are usually 
interpreted fairly liberally.
116 
If an appeal against an estimated assessment is being 
made and the form provided by the Revenue is not used, 
the grounds are frequently stated to be that the 
assessment is estimated, excessive in amount or 
erroneous in law. 
.... 
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rbwever, al though taxpayers may state the grounds widely they are 
advised to be more precise in case the Crown objects that the 
statement of the grounds is too broad. Specificity is also 
advocated to prevent delays in disposing of the objection.
117 
If the appeal is to the Special Commissioners then, 
whether the original ground of appeal was of the 
broader or the narrower type , the parties will be 
expected to agree on a "question for determination" to 
be notified to the commissioners at the time when the 
Inspector of Taxes asks for the case to be listed for 
hearing. Generally, if on the hearing of an appeal the 
appellant desires to go into any ground of appeal which 
was not specified in the notice, it will be desirable 
to give as much notice as possible to the inspector 
since, if the new ground takes him by surprise, there 
will be nothing to prevent him from asking the commis-
sioners to adjourn the case to enable him to consider 
the point properly. 
To summarise the provisions in the three jurisdictions reviewed, 
where a rule analogous to the New Zealand one exists it is either 
interpreted liberally, for example as in Australia, or cast in less 
restrictive terms, for example in the United Kingdom. 
The restriction of grounds must be, it is submitted, to facilitate 
. l d d l t. f th b. t. llB H . a s1mp e an spee y reso u 10n o e o Jee 10n. owever, 1n 
practice is would appear to result in unfairness to the taxpayer. 
The taxpayer must prepare argument quickly, without necessarily 
knowing the grounds for the Commissioner's argument, and then is 
restricted to those grounds. It is submitted that the rule should 
be changed to permit the taxpayer to amend the grounds when fully 
appraised of the Commissioner's argument. This is in keeping with 
the general law. 
Coupled with a pre-proceeding conference (discussed below), such a 
reform would, it is submitted, achieve fairness without sacrificing 
the aim of efficient disposal of objections. 
c. 
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Onus of Proof 
Section 36 of the Inland Revenue Department Act 1974 
states in part: 
On the hearing and determination of any objection: 
... 
subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of Sec
tion 
234 of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954, the burden
 of 
proof shall be on the objector. 
The same rule applies to a case stated to the High C
ourt. 119 
The courts have held that the taxpayer must prove t
hat the assess-
ment is incorrect and the extent to which it is wro
ng. Richardson, 
J. in Buckley Young Ltd v. CIR
120 reviewed previous cases and 
quoted with approval Moller, J. in Lancaster v. 
Commissioner of 
121 
Inland Revenue · where he said the question 
for the court 
is:122 
On all the evidence, has the taxpayer discharged 
the 
onus of demonstrating that the Commissioner's ass
ess-
ment was wrong, and, if so, why it was wrong, and 
how 
far it was wrong? 
Richardson, J. continued:
123 
The reason for this statutory onus is obvious enou
gh. 
lhe Commissioner could not sensibly be expected to b
ear 
the onus of proof of matters which originate with 
the 
taxpayer and which usually are peculiarly within 
his 
knowledge and power. lhus, there are sound if 
not 
compelling practical reasons why the legislat
ion 
requires him to provide satisfactory evidence 
to 
support his calculation of his assessable income. 
lhe taxpayer must discharge the onus of proof on 
the balance of 
probabilities. lhis will result sometimes in the 
taxpayer having 
to prove a negative. This has been challenged by 
counsel at the 
Court of Appeal who argued (in a case concerning pro
perty disposal) 
that the taxpayer will succeed if, having put forwar
d the evidence, 
there is no evidence from which it can be conc
luded that the 
Commissioner's argument is correct .
124 lhe Court rejected this, 
holding that such an interpretation would result in
 reversing the 
requirement that the burden of proof be on the taxpa
yer. 1
25 
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Richmond, P. said: 126 
I think that the ordinary and natural meaning of the 
New Zealand section [Section 36 of the Inland Revenue 
Department Act 1974] is to require an objector to 
establish one or more of the grounds of its objection 
are correct, even if this involves him (sic) in proving 
a negative, as is the position in the present case. 
(Ole commentator has said that proving a negative is a 
notoriously difficult 
this has to be so for" 
position ... 11 , but concludes however 
the system to work at all. 11 ) 127 
II 
that 
The onus of proof being on the taxpayer is one of the few areas of 
the objection and appeal procedure which has aroused comment. 
With regard to the New Zealand prov1s1on commentators have not been 
critical. For example, Molloy states: 128 
Except in respect of an objection to an assessment of 
penal tax - where the onus is on the Commissioner to 
prove the offence in respect of which it is chargeable 
- the onus of proof is eneludibly and ineluctably on 
the objector. Generally, this is not unfair in that 
most of the essential facts will be within his exclu-
sive knowledge. 
However, reform has been advocated in the limited area of objec-
tions against discretionary determinations of the Commissioner. In 
these cases it was suggested by Reddy that the objector should only 
need to raise prima facie evidence which would support a different 
conclusion for the burden of proof to be shifted to the Commis-
sioner .129 She argued that this would ensure that an objector 
could properly prepare a case. 
Commentators overseas have, however, been much more forceful in 
their condemnation of the rule that the taxpayer carries the onus 
of proof. 
logical for 
argues: 130 
For example in Australia, although noting that it is 
the taxpayer to bear the onus of proof, Brown 
.... 
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On the other hand the Commissioner has received the 
material information. rie has selected what is neces-
sary to make his assessment. He stands or falls on the 
facts which he considers relevant. It may be that the 
onus should be on him to state the facts which he 
considers relevant and on which he has made his 
determination. 
More specifically, Myers argues that where an appeal is made by the 
Commissioner from a Board of Review to a Court then the Commis-
sioner should bear the onus of proof. The existing provisions were 
characterised as giving the Commissioner "... substantial proce-
dural advantages ... 11 • 131 
In England in appeals to the Commissioners the onus of proof is on 
the taxpayer to show that the assessment should be reduced or set 
aside. 132 The' English provision is based on the established 
evidential rule which applies where there are facts peculiarly 
within the knowledge of one of the parties.
133 
The existence or non-existence of a fact in issue may 
be known for certain by one of the parties. It is only 
reasonable that this should affect the evidential 
burden in some cases. 
In Canada the legislation does not specify on whom the burden of 
proof rests. The courts have decided, however, that the onus is on 
the taxpayer. 
134 . 135 
For example, in Johnston v. MNR the Court said: 
Every such fact found or assumed by the assessor or the 
Minister must then be accepted as it was dealt with by 
these persons unless questioned by the appellant. 
If, however, the Minister does not allege as a fact an ingredient 
essential to the validity of the assessment then the taxpayer is 
not obliged to disprove that fact.
136 
Ole commentator, Wolff, states that this attitude was probably 
based on the general scheme of the Act which requires the taxpayer 
to avail him or herself of the appeal procedures.
137 
.... 
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Wolff notes the argument based on the view that the facts are 
peculiarly within the knowledge of the taxpayer mentioned above, 
but believes it is not an adequate justification for placing the 
burden on the taxpayer. He argues that such a rule is unfair to 
the taxpayer: 138 
And while the facts stated in the return or the notice 
of objection may be peculiarly within the knowledge of 
the taxpayer, the contary may well be true with respect 
to those facts underlying the assessment or re-assess-
ment, which may have been made after investigation by 
the Minister or the seizure of the taxpayer's 
documents. The taxpayer may, indeed, be completely at 
sea as to the facts relied on by the Minister when the 
matter is viewed in this way. 
misconception 
taxpayer. He 
whereas they 
about 
states 
should 
Wolff argues that there is a fundamental 
objections which resui t in unfairness to the 
that objections are regarded as appeals 
properly be regarded as what he described as" 
by the Minister for disputed amounts of tax 11 • 139 
trials of actions 
Therefore, he argues, the rules about the burden of proof in 
appeals is followed, yet in other respects the taxpayer is dis-
advantaged, because it is a trial of an action for a disputed 
amount of tax the taxpayer does not have the usual protections of a 
defendant in a. civil action, for example, the filing of a statement 
of claim setting out the grounds of the dispute. The Minister is 
not required to reveal the arguments and grounds being relied on in 
the assessment. 
Wolff proposed, therefore, the following changes to the procedure. 
The party bearing the responsibility of imposing income tax should 
be required to file the first pleading in the courts. · The tax-
payer's objection would then take the form of a statement of 
defence filed in response. Then, if the parties could not reach 
agreement after the conferences, the Minister would be required to 
file a statement of claim alleging the facts and the statutory 
provisions relied upon. The taxpayer would then file a statement 
of defence. 140 
. . - --·--·-·-·-----~~ 
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The legal burden of proof would be the same as in any 
other action, to be decided on the pleadings. Facts 
denied by the taxpayer would have to be proved by the 
Minister, and other fact s pleaded by way of defence 
would have to be proved by the taxpayer ... 
There would be a pres umption of law that fact s alleged 
by the Minister in his statement of claim existed, in 
the absence of evidence to the contary. This would 
have the effect of shifting the evidential - but not 
the legal - burden of proof on the facts to the 
taxpayer in the first instance. 
Wolff submitted that this proposal would not place the Revenue 
Department in a. more disadvantageous position in disputes. 
This discussion on the onus of proof highlights one of the 
conflicts arising from the use of administrative tribunals. On the 
one hand, to achieve the aim of speedy and efficient disposal of 
cases the full procedural requirements of the courts are bypassed, 
but on the other hand this may result in unfairness which is the 
very reason for the development of the procedural requirements. 
The traditional justification for imposing the onus on the tax-
payer, that is, that the matters are peculiarly within the tax-
payer's knowledge, does not appear convincing in circumstances 
where the taxpayer may not have knowledge of the basis of the 
Commissioner's assessment. 
Commentators have proposed shifting the burden, either through 
requiring the taxpayer to raise prima facie evidence which would 
shift the burden to the Commissioner (as Reddy proposed), or 
putting the onus on the party seeking to rely on a fact, but the 
evidential burden on the taxpayer in the first instance (as Wolff 
proposed). 
It is submitted that in the majority of cases it is not unfair for 
the taxpayer to have the onus of proof because the facts will be 
within his or her knowledge. In circumstances where that is not 
so, however, and discretionary determinations of the Commissioner 
.... 
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provide an example (where the grounds on which the determination is 
made is known only to the Commissioner), then Reddy' s proposal 
would appear to be fair to the taxpayer without disadvantaging the 
Commissioner. 
The Taxpayer's Right to Information 
The New Zealand tax legislation does not make speci fi e prov1s1on 
for the taxpayer to acquire information about the basis of the 
Commissioner's opinion in making the assessment. This point has 
been considered by the courts however in relation to a case stated 
for the High Court. 
In Cates v. crn141 the Court of Appeal held tht the High Court 
has jurisdiction to order discovery of documents held by the 
Commissioner pursuant to Section 27 of the Crown Proceedings Act 
1950. The court also has inherent jurisdiction to order the 
Commissioner to supply further particulars. The Court 
however, that discovery would only be ordered in rare cases. 
believes that the case , will result in a greater use of 
very.142 
said, 
Green 
disco-
As to the taxpayer's right to information prior to the request for 
a case stated, Simcock and Rooke submit that if the Commissioner 
refused to supply the information, the refusal may be open to 
review under Section 4(1) of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 143 
The issue of whether the Taxation Review Authority has the power to 
order the Commissioner to provide information was examined in Case 
F. 7o. 144 The Authority decided that Section 4C of the Commis-
sions of Inquiry Act 1908 applied, that is, by virtue of Section 
330) the Authority is deemed to be a commission of inquiry, and 
therefore Section 4C empowers the Commission to, inter alia, 
require the Commissioner to furnish information. 
w\; 
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Simcock and Rooke argue, however, that because the cases make it 
clear that the. Commissioner will be required to provide information 
only infrequently, the taxpayer is still disadvantaged. They point 
out that it: 145 
is a difficult onus to discharge when the taxpayer 
must remain ignorant of or second guess the basis upon 
which the Commissioner proceeded. 
Green stresses that evidence in tax cases is critical because the 
onus is on the taxpayer. Therefore he argues that:
146 
It is, after all, only logical that where the Depart-
ment has extensive powers of investigation and powers 
to compel the production of documents the taxpayer, who 
starts from behind scratch in so many respects, should 
be able to obtain the basis for the Department's view 
and a clear and unambiguous reason for any assessment 
or amended assessment that has been made. 
In Australia the issue of the taxpayer's right to information has 
been discussed in the courts. In Bailey & Ors v. F. C. of T .
147 
the Full High Court ordered the Commissioner to supply particulars 
to the taxpayer, on the grounds that the High Court had the 
inherent jurisdiction to order the sLpply of particulars if it 
appears just to do so. 
The Asprey Committee, commenting on the previous situation when it 
had been held that the Board could not order the Commissioner to 
supply the taxpayer with particulars, stated that natural justice 
required that the taxpayer should have sufficient knowledge of the 
Commissioner's basis for decision to enable the taxpayer to prepare 
legal argument relevant to the issue the Board will be rleci-
ding.148 It recommended, therefore that the Board be given 
discretionary power to supply the taxpayer with particulars as to 
the computation of the assessment and the reasoning on which the 
Commissioner's decision was based. 
It is submitted that establishing the taxpayer's right to informa-
tion would not only be fair to the taxpayer but it would also 
... 
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enhance the speedy and efficient disposal of objections. The 
taxpayer would then be able to prepare a better case, having been 
able to focus on the Commissioner's grounds. The provision of 
information should not have to be at the discretion of the first 
tribunal as the Asprey Committee recommended, b1Jt should be 
specifically legislated for (in view of the restrictive approach 
taken by the Courts). Such provision should deal with the right to 
information before both a court hearing and a hearing before an 
Authority. 
Time Limits 
en the reverse side of the Income Tax Notice of Assessment it is 
stated that an objection "... must be delivered or posted to the 
District Commissioner, Inland Revenue Department at the office of 
issue within one month of date of ·issue. 11149 There is no time 
limit on the Commissioner when considering the objection . 150 If 
it is not wholly allowed by the Commissioner, the objector may 
within two months of the notice of the disallowance, require that 
the objection be heard by the Authority (or the Commissioner state 
a case for the opinion of the High Court). 151 
The Department, having received notice of the objection, must file 
the case with the Taxation Review Authority within six months. 152 
If it does not, the Authority shall make an order allowing the 
objection, unless it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds 
for the failure to file . 153 At any time before the hearing the 
Commissioner can file an amended case and the objector can file an 
amended answer. 154 
By contrast, a taxpayer who objects under the Canadian legislation 
must serve notice on the Minister within ninety days . 155 If the 
', 
taxpayer is not notified of the Minister's decision within 180 days 
he or she may appeal to the Tax Appeal Board . 156 There is also a 
time limit of 120 days for an appeal from the decision of the Tax 
Appeal Board to the Exchequer Court of Canada. 157 
-
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Provision is also made for filing cases directly with a Board or 
the Federal Court with the Minister's consent. The consent is not 
usually forthcoming because it may result in a court hearing before 
there has been time to investigate all the issues . 158 However, 
the provision is appropriate for cases where all the issues have 
been thoroughly canvassed and neither side has any new points to 
raise. 
In Australia a time limit of sixty days is imposed on the taxpayer 
to lodge an objection after having received an assessment. 159 In 
addition, there is a time limit of sixty days for the service of a 
notice requesting that the Commissioner's decision be referred to a 
Board of Review or a Supreme Court. 160 
In England a notice of appeal must be given within thirty days of 
the date of the notice of the assessment. 161 If dissatisfied 
with the determination of the Commissioners, either side must 
declare its dissatisfaction immediately, and file written notice 
within thirty days of a request for a case stated for the opinion 
of the High Court. 162 
The New Zealand limit of one month has been criticised by both the 
Department of Inland Revenue and commentators concerned with the 
taxpayer's position. The Department recommended to the Public and 
Administrative Law Reform Committee that the time period be 
extended to two months, although the Committee rejected this. 
Their reason was the belief that an extension to two months would 
increase delays and uncertainty. 163 
Green argues that one month is too short in view of the complexity 
of many tax cases: 164 
It is just not practicable in many circumstances to 
lodge an objection, the grounds of which are going to 
be binding on the taxpayer, within the thirty day 
period allowed by the Act. Given delays in the mail, 
the necessity for discussion between the accounting and 
legal advisors and the perusal of what may often be 
vast numbers of documents it is essential that more 
time be given. 
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The Asprey Committee reviewed the issue of time limits and conluded 
that sixty days to lodge an objection was reasonable in practically 
all cases. 165 It recommended that provision be made for further 
time to be granted in unusual circumstances. 
The Committee did not favour imposing a time limit on the Commis-
sioner for making a decision on the objection, for similar reasons 
to those that Green advances for permitting the taxpayer more 
time. It cited the fact that the grounds of the objection may be: 
" ... lengthy and complex and raise important questions of law
11
•
166 
It also referred to the pressure of work on the Commissioner, and 
the double duty of care on the Commissioner (i.e. to the taxpayer 
and the requirements of the Act). 
The time limits that do exist are designed to ensure the speedy 
disposal of cases. This is undermined, however, if long delays 
arise at other points of the process. On the other hand, speedy 
disposal should not be pursued at the expense of fairness, which is 
particularly relevant in complex cases. 
It is submitted that the one month limit for making an objection be 
able to be extended to two months, and that a time limit be imposed 
on the Commissioner for making a decision on the objection. The 
problems in such a requirement as highlighted by the Asprey 
Committee are recognised, but that it is possible is illustrated by 
the canadian legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has drawn on experience in other jurisdictions to make 
recommendations for reform of the objection and appeal procedure in 
t\lew Zealand. f-bwever, by focussing on certain issues it is easy to 
lose sight of the fact that the systems in the different jurisdic-
tions operate within different social settings. For example, the 
:,:> . 
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Canadian and American systems rely on extensive public relations 
campaigns to ensure that taxpayers are aware of their rights and 
obligations. This facilitates effective use of those objection 
procedures which are available. In the United States of America 
there is an emphasis, arising from the political context, on 
permitting taxpayers to take their own proceedings without the use 
of counsel. 
But there is a large degree of uniformity in the jurisdictions 
surveyed, and from this basis recommendations are made. It is also 
possible to gain guidance from Australia and Canada which have 
conducted reviews of their objection and appeal procedures. 
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